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Abstract This paper develops a dynamic model of discrete choice that incorporates
peer effects into consideration sets. We characterize equilibrium behavior and study
the empirical content of the dynamic model we offer. In our set-up, the choices
of friends act as exclusion restrictions in the stochastic variation of the subset of
alternatives that each person considers at the moment of picking an option. They
allow us to recover (from a sequence of observed choices) the ranking of preferences of
each person, the attention mechanism, and the set of connections or nodes between
the people in the network. The identification strategy we offer does not rely on the
variation of the set of available options (or menus) which remain the same across all
the observations.
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1. Introduction
Much research has shown that peer effects have a predominant role in explaining people’s choices.
In the context of discrete choice models, the basic idea is that a person is more likely to select a
specific option if more of her friends are doing so. These models typically assume that the person
is aware of all the available options and the choices of friends affect her ranking of preferences.
The more recent literature on (single-agent) consideration set models relaxes this full awareness
postulate by allowing for the possibility that people consider only a subset of the available options
when making a decision. We develop a dynamic model of discrete choice that incorporates peer
effects in the formation of consideration sets. In doing so, we offer an alternative mechanism for
peer effects. By studying its empirical content we show our model is quite tractable from an
econometrics perspective.
In our set-up, people are connected through a social network. Each person in the network has
a strict preference order over a finite set of options or alternatives. At random times, governed
by independent Poisson "alarm clocks", a given person has the opportunity to pick up an option.
(The person sticks to this option till the revision opportunity arises again.) We assume the person
is boundedly rational and does not consider all the available options at the moment of revising her
selection. Instead, she observes the choices of her friends and forms a consideration set. Then the
person selects the most preferred option among the ones she is actually considering. This model
leads to a sequence of choices that evolve through time according to a continuous time Markov
process.
We initially show the dynamic system has a unique equilibrium (or invariant distribution). We
do so under the assumption that each person considers each option with non zero probability. This
restriction assures that we can move from any initial configuration of choices to any other one in
finite time. That is, the dynamic system is irreducible. We then imagine we can observe a long
sequence of choices across people in the network. We provide alternative conditions under which
datasets of this sort allow us to recover all the primitives of the model. That is, the strict preference
relation of each person, the attention mechanism, and (surprisingly) the set of connections between
the people in the network!
We build the identification results in a sequence of related steps. First, we assume the researcher
can recover the conditional choice probabilities of all people in the network. Each of these proba-
bilities informs us about the frequency of choices of a given person conditional on the alternatives
selected by others. In our model, the probability of paying attention to a specific option increases
in the number of friends who are currently adopting it. Thus, the choices of friends act as exclusion
restrictions in the stochastic variation of the consideration sets. This variation allows us to recover
the set of connections between the people in the network and their ranking of preferences. We can
then use this information to recover the attention mechanism of each person, i.e., the probability
of including a specific option in the consideration set as a function of the number of friends who
are adopting it. Interestingly, the identification strategy we pursue does not rely (as most of the
theoretical work on consideration sets) on variation of the set of available options (or menus).
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Second, we study identification of the conditional choice probabilities. We consider three
datasets that differ regarding its informational content: continuous-time data; discrete-time data
with arbitrary time intervals; and the distribution of equilibrium choices. The first two datasets
allow us to recover the transition rate matrix of the dynamic system (also known as the infinitesi-
mal generator matrix in the statistical literature), and from there we can identify the conditional
choice probabilities. In the case of continuous-time data the transition rate matrix is identified
without any extra restrictions. To identify the transition rate matrix using discrete-time data with
arbitrary time intervals, we invoke insights from Blevins (2017, 2018). This latter result exploits
the fact that the transition rate matrix in our model is rather parsimonious. To see why, note that
the selection revision process governed by the independent Poisson "alarm clocks" implies that the
probability that two or more people revise their selected options at the same time is zero. This
property translates into a transition rate matrix that has zeros in many known locations.
In the last dataset, we study the possibility of recovering the conditional choice probabilities
from equilibrium behavior. (This dataset is clearly less informative than the two previous ones.)
To this end, we first show that, under symmetry restrictions, the equilibrium behavior of our model
coincides with the so-called Gibbs equilibrium. In this context, identification follows immediately.
In particular, the conditional choice probabilities of each person coincide with the corresponding
conditional probabilities obtained from equilibrium behavior. We offer some insights to extend
this idea to the heterogeneous case.
From a modelling perspective, our set-up combines the dynamic model of social interactions of
Blume (1993, 1995) with the (single-agent) model of random consideration sets of Manzini and Mariotti
(2014). By adding peer effects into the consideration sets we are able to use the choices of others
as instruments to recover preferences. As we mentioned above, the literature on identification
of single-agent consideration set models have mainly relied on variation of the set of available op-
tions or menus. The latter includes Aguiar (2017), Aguiar et al. (2016), Brady and Rehbeck (2016),
Caplin et al. (2018), Cattaneo et al. (2017), Horan (2018), Lleras et al. (2017), Manzini and Mariotti
(2014), and Masatlioglu et al. (2012).1 (See Aguiar et al. (2019) for a comparison of several consid-
eration set models in an experimental setting.) Other papers have relied on the existence of exoge-
nous covariates that shift preferences or consideration sets. The latter include Abaluck and Adams
(2017), Barseghyan et al. (2019), Conlon and Mortimer (2013), Draganska and Klapper (2011),
Gaynor et al. (2016), Goeree (2008), Mehta et al. (2003), and Roberts and Lattin (1991).
As we also mentioned, we can recover from the data the set of connections or nodes between
the people in the network. In the context of linear models, a few recent papers have made progress
in the same direction. Among them, Blume et al. (2015), Bonaldi et al. (2015), De Paula et al.
(2018), and Manresa (2013). In the context of discrete-choice, Chambers et al. (2019) also identify
the network structure but in their model peer effects do not affect consideration sets but preferences
(among many other differences).
The connection between the equilibrium behavior in our model and the Gibbs equilibrium is
similar to the one in Blume and Durlauf (2003).
1See also Manski (1977) for a throughout formulation of the discrete choice model that incorporates the possibility
that the decision maker only considers a sub-set of options.
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Let us finally mention two other papers that incorporate peer effects in the formation of con-
sideration sets: Borah and Kops (2018) do so in a static framework and relies on variation of
menus for identification. Lazzati (2018) considers a dynamic model but the time is discrete and
she focuses on two binary options that can be acquired together.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes equilibrium
behavior. Section 3 studies the empirical content of the model. Section 4 presents some simulation
results for a model of choosing a restaurant and Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Social Network, Consideration Sets, and Choices
There is a finite set of people connected through a social network. The network is described by a
simple graph Γ = (A, e), where A = {1, 2, ..., A} is the set of nodes (or people) and e is the set of
edges. Each edge identifies two connected people. For each person a ∈ A, her set of friends (or
reference group) is defined as follows
Na = {a′ ∈ A : a′ 6= a and a′ is connected to a through an edge in Γ} .
There is a set of alternatives Y = Y ∪ {o} from which each person might choose, where Y =
{1, 2, ..., Y } is a finite set of options and o is a default option. Each person a has a strict preference
order ≻a over the set of options Y . All people agree in that the default option is the least preferred.
We refer to y = (ya)a∈A ∈ Y
A
as a choice configuration.
We model the strategy revision process of alternatives as a continuous time Markov process on
the space of choice configurations that describes the evolution of people choices through time. In
particular, we assume that people are endowed with independent Poisson "alarm clocks" with rates
λ = (λa)a∈A. At randomly chosen moments (exponentially distributed with mean 1/λa) the alarm
of person a goes off.2 When this happens, the person selects the most preferred alternative among
the ones she is actually considering. If her consideration set does not include any alternative in Y ,
then the person selects the default option.
In our model, whether person a pays attention to a particular alternative depends on the
configuration of choices of her friends at the moment of revising her selection. Let Nva(y) be the
number of friends of person a who select option v in choice configuration y. Formally,
Nva(y) =
∑
a′∈Na
1 (ya′ = v)
2That is, each person a is endowed with a collection of random variables {τa
n
}∞
n=1
such that each difference
τa
n
− τa
n−1
is exponentially distributed with mean 1/λa. All these differences are independent across people and
time.
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where 1(·) is the standard indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the underlying event is
true and 0 otherwise. The probability that person a pays attention to alternative v ∈ Y given a
choice configuration y is Qa(v|Nva(y)). That is, whether the person pays attention to a specific
alternative depends on how popular that alternative is among her group of reference. By combining
preferences and stochastic consideration sets, the probability that person a selects (at the moment
of choosing) alternative v ∈ Y is given by
Pa(v|y) = Qa(v|Nva(y))
∏
v′∈Y ,v′≻av
[
1−Qa(v′|Nv
′
a (y))
]
. (1)
The probability of selecting the outside option o is just
∏
v∈Y [1−Qa(v|Nva(y))]. That is, the default
option is selected only when the consideration set is empty.
Let us add two comments about our model. First, it represents a truly boundedly rational
model in the sense that people do not solve a dynamic optimization problem and their choice sets
may thereby not include their most preferred alternatives for substantially long periods of time.
Second, the only source of randomness in choice is via consideration sets. In this sense, our model
captures a single, though important, channel of possible mistakes in choices. The social network
shapes the nature and the strength of these mistakes.
Remark The attention mechanism we use assumes that the probability of paying attention to
a given option depends on the choices of peers at the moment of revising the selection. It is
independent of the current option of the person. The model can be easily modified to include the
possibility that the current option indeed affects the option that the person picks at the moment
of revising her selection. All our results will go through with mild modifications except for the
connection of our model with the Gibbs random field models.
2.2. Equilibrium
The independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Poisson "alarm clocks", which lead the selection
revision process, guarantee that at each time interval at most one person revises her selection
almost surely. Thus, the transition rates between choice configurations that differ in more than
one component are zero. Formally, the transition rate from choice configuration y to any different
one y′ is as follows
m(y′|y) =
 0 if
∑
a∈A 1(y′a 6= ya) > 1∑
a∈A λaPa(y′a|y)1(y
′
a 6= ya) if
∑
a∈A 1(y′a 6= ya) = 1
. (2)
In the statistical literature on continuous time Markov processes these transition rates are the out
of diagonal terms of the transition rate matrix (also known as the infinitesimal generator matrix).
The rate of transition out from a given choice configuration y is simply
m(y|y) = −
∑
y′∈Y
A
\{y}
m(y′|y).
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We will indicate byM the transition rate matrix. In our model, the number of choice configurations
is (Y +1)A. Thus, M is a (Y +1)A× (Y +1)A matrix. There are many different ways of ordering
the choice configurations and thereby writing the transition rate matrix. To avoid any sort of
ambiguity in the exposition, we will let the choice configurations be ordered according to the
lexicographic order with o treated as zero. Constructed in this way the first element of M is (for
instance) M11 = m
(
(o, o, ..., o)′ | (o, o, . . . , o)′
)
. Formally, let ι(y) ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , (Y + 1)A
}
be the
position of y according to the lexicographic order. Then,
Mι(y)ι(y′) = m(y′|y).
An equilibrium in our model is an invariant distribution µ : Y
A
→ [0, 1], with
∑
y∈Y
A µ(y) = 1,
of the dynamic process with transition rate matrix M. It indicates the likelihood of each choice
configuration y in the long run. This equilibrium behavior relates to the transition rate matrix in
a linear fashion
µM = 0.
To guarantee existence of such an equilibrium we impose a simple restriction. This extra assump-
tion will also play a key role in the identification of the model.
(A1) For each a ∈ A, v ∈ Y , and y ∈ Y
A
,
1 > Qa(v|Nva(y)) > 0.
Assumption A1 simply states that, for any choice configuration, the probability that each
person considers any given option at the moment of revising her selection is strictly positive. It
implies that each subset of options is considered with non zero probability.
Below, we let µ−a(y−a) =
∑
v∈Y µ(v,y−a) with y−a = (ya′)a′∈A\{a} ∈ Y
A−1
. Proposition 2.1
states equilibrium existence and characterizes equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 2.1. If A1 is satisfied, then there exists a unique µ. Also, µ satisfies
µ(y) =
1∑
a∈A λa
∑
a∈A
λaPa(ya|y)µ−a(y−a) for each y ∈ Y
A
.
Proof For an irreducible, finite-state continuous Markov chain the steady-state µ exists and it is
unique. Thus, we only need to prove that A1 implies that the Markov chain induced by our model
is irreducible. First notice that, under A1, for each a ∈ A, ya ∈ Y , and y ∈ Y
A
, we have that
1 > Pa(ya|y) = Qa(ya|Nyaa (y))
∏
v∈Y ,v≻aya
[1−Qa(v|Nva(y))] > 0.
To show irreducibility, let y and y′ be two different choice configurations. It follows from expression
(2) that we can go from one configuration to the other one with positive probability in less than
A steps.
The characterization of µ follows as the invariant distribution satisfies the balance condition
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∑
y′∈Y
A µ(y′)m(y|y′) = 0 for each y ∈ Y
A
. The next steps show this claim.
∑
y′∈Y
A µ(y′)m(y|y′) = 0
µ(y)
(
−
∑
y′∈Y
A
\{y}
m(y′|y)
)
+
∑
y′∈Y
A
\{y}
µ(y′)m(y|y′) = 0
−µ(y)
∑
a∈A
∑
y′a∈Y\{ya}
λaPa(y′a|y) +
∑
a∈A
∑
y′a∈Y\{ya}
µ(y′a,y−a)λaPa(ya|y
′
a,y−a) = 0
−µ(y)
∑
a∈A
λa(1− Pa(ya|y)) +
∑
a∈A
∑
y′a∈Y\{ya}
µ(y′a,y−a)λaPa(ya|y
′
a,y−a) = 0
1∑
a∈A λa
∑
a∈A
λa
{∑
y′a∈Y
µ(y′a,y−a)Pa(ya|y
′
a,y−a)
}
= µ(y)
1∑
a∈A λa
∑
a∈A
λaPa(ya|y)µ−a(y−a) = µ(y).
In moving from the fifth line to the sixth one we used the fact that, in our model, Pa(ya|y′a,y−a) =
Pa (ya|y−a) for any y′a ∈ Y
A
. 
The next example describes the equilibrium behavior of a simple specification of our model.
Example 1: There are two identical, connected people that select among two alternatives, namely,
option 1 and the default option o. The rates for their Poisson "alarm clocks" are 1. Thus, for
a = 1, 2, we get that
Pa(1|y) = Q(1|Nva(y)) and Pa(o|y) = 1−Q(1|N
v
a(y)).
Note that we avoided the sub-index in Q because of the symmetry.
The transition rate matrix M is as follows. (The columns are ordered as the rows.)
(o, o) −2Q(1|0) Q(1|0) Q(1|0) 0
(o, 1) 1−Q(1|0) 0 −1 + Q(1|0)−Q(1|1) Q(1|1)
(1, o) 1−Q(1|0) −1 + Q(1|0)−Q(1|1) 0 Q(1|1)
(1, 1) 0 1−Q(1|1) 1−Q(1|1) −2 + 2Q(1|1)
By Proposition 2.1, after simple calculations, the steady-state equilibrium is given by
µ(o, o) =
[1−Q(1|0)] [1−Q(1|1)]
N
,
µ(o, 1) = µ(1, o) =
Q(1|0) [1−Q(1|1)]
N
,
µ(1, 1) =
Q(1|0)Q(1|1)
N
with N = 1−Q(1|1) + Q(1|0). 
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3. Empirical Content of the Model
This section states a set of alternative conditions under which the model is identified. The require-
ments we propose vary with the strength of the datasets we consider. As it is always the case with
identification, we will abstract from small sample issues. The aim of our analysis is to provide
conditions under which the researcher can uniquely recover (from the data) the set of connections
Γ = (A, e), the profile of strict preferences (≻a)a∈A, the attention mechanism (Qa)a∈A, and (when
possible) the rates of the Poisson "alarm clocks" (λa)a∈A.
We will separate the identification analysis in two parts. First, we will assume the researcher
knows the conditional choice probabilities (Pa)a∈A and will provide conditions under which the
main parts of the model can be uniquely recovered from this information. We will then elaborate
on the identification of the conditional choice probabilities (Pa)a∈A.
3.1. Identification of the Model Knowing (Pa)a∈A
Let us initially assume the researcher knows the conditional choice probabilities (Pa)a∈A. The
identification strategy we pursue relies on two extra assumptions.
(A2) For each a ∈ A, |Na| > 0.
(A3) For each a ∈ A and v ∈ Y , Qa(v|Nva(y)) is strictly increasing in N
v
a(y).
Assumption A2 requires each person to have at least one friend. Assumption A3 states that
each person pays more attention to a particular option if more of her friends are adopting it. Under
assumptions A1-A3, the choices of peers act as exclusion restrictions in the stochastic variation of
the consideration sets. This variation allows us to recover the connections (or edges) between the
people in the network and the ranking of preferences of each of them. We can then sequentially
identify the attention mechanism of each person moving from the most preferred alternative to the
least preferred one. Proposition 3.1 formalizes these claims.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose A1-A3 are satisfied and we know (Pa)a∈A. Then, the set of connections
Γ = (A, e), the profile of strict preferences (≻a)a∈A, and the attention mechanism (Qa)a∈A are
identified.
Proof By A1, Pa has full support for all y. By A2 and A3, Pa(v|y) is strictly decreasing in Nv
′
a (y)
for each v′ ≻a v. Thus, we can recover Na. Since this is true for each a ∈ A, we can get Γ = (A, e).
In addition, from variation of Nv
′
a (y) for each v
′ 6= v, we can recover the upper level set of person
a corresponding to option v. That is,
{v′ ∈ Y : v′ ≻a v} .
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By repeating the exercise with each alternative, we can recover ≻a. Finally, suppose that y∗a is the
most preferred alternative for person a. Then,
Pa(y∗a|y) = Qa
(
y∗a|N
y∗a
a (y)
)
.
It follows that we can recover Qa
(
y∗a|N
y∗a
a (y)
)
. By proceeding in descending preference ordering
we can then recover Qa(v|Nva(y)) for all v ∈ Y . 
3.2. Identification of (Pa)a∈A
This section studies identification of the conditional choice probabilities and (when possible) the
rates of the Poisson "alarm clocks" from three different datasets.
In the first two datasets the researcher observes people’s choices at time intervals of length ∆
and can consistently estimate Pr
(
yt+∆ = y′|yt = y
)
for each pair y′,y ∈ Y
A
. We will capture
these transition probabilities by a matrix P(∆). (Here again, we will assume that the choice
configurations are ordered according to the lexicographic order when we construct P(∆).) The
connection between P(∆) and M is as follows
P(∆) = e(∆M).
The first two datasets only differ regarding ∆. Specifically, in the first dataset we let the time
interval be very small. We can think of this dataset as the "ideal dataset" that registers people’s
choices in continuous time. With the proliferation of on-line platforms and scanner this sort of
data might indeed be available for some applications! In the second dataset we allow the time
interval to be of arbitrary size. Finally, in the third dataset we assume the researcher can only
recover the distribution of equilibrium choices. It is rather simple to see that the informational
content decreases as we move from the first to the last dataset.
The next table formally describes the three datasets we consider.
Dataset 1 The researcher knows lim∆→0P(∆)
Dataset 2 The researcher knows P(∆)
Dataset 3 The researcher knows µ
The first result of this section is as follows.
Proposition 3.2 (Dataset 1). The conditional choice probabilities (Pa)a∈A and the rates of the
Poisson "alarm clocks" (λa)a∈A are identified.
Proof Since lim∆→0P(∆) =M, we can recover transition rate matrix from the data. Recall that
m(y′|y) =
 0 if
∑
a∈A 1(y′a 6= ya) > 1∑
a∈A λaPa(y′a|y)1(y
′
a 6= ya) if
∑
a∈A 1(y′a 6= ya) = 1
.
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Thus, λaPa(y′a|y) = m(y
′
a,y−a|y). It follows that we can recover λaPa(v|y) for each v ∈ Y , y ∈ Y
A
,
and a ∈ A. Notice that, for each y ∈ Y
A
,
∑
v∈Y
λaPa(v|y) = λa
∑
v∈Y
Pa(v|y) = λa.
Then we can also recover λa for each a ∈ A. 
Remark. The proof of Proposition 3.2 relies on the fact that when the time interval between
the observations goes to zero, then we can recover M. There are at least two well-known cases
that produce the same outcome without requiring ∆→ 0. The first one happens when the length
interval ∆ is below a threshold ∆. The second one occurs when the researcher can observe the
dynamic system at two different length intervals ∆1 and ∆2 that are not multiple of each other.
(See, e.g., Blevins (2017) and the literature therein.)
The next proposition states that, by adding an extra restriction, the transition rate matrix can
be identified from people’s choices even if these choices are observed at the endpoints of long time
intervals. In this case, the researcher needs to know the rates of the Poisson "alarm clocks", or
normalize them in empirical work.
Proposition 3.3 (Dataset 2). If A2 is satisfied, we know (λa)a∈A and M has distinct eigenvalues
that do not differ by an integer multiple of 2pii/∆, then the conditional choice probabilities (Pa)a∈A
are generically identified.
Proof This proof builds on Theorem 1 of Blevins (2017) and Theorem 3 of Blevins (2018). For the
present case, it follows from the last two theorems, that the transition rate matrixM is generically
identified if, in addition to the conditions in Proposition 3.3, we have that
(Y + 1)A − AY − 1 ≥
1
2
.
This condition is always satisfied if A > 1. Identification ofM follows because, by A2, A ≥ 2. We
can then uniquely recover (Pa)a∈A from M. See the proof of Proposition 3.2 
The key element in proving Proposition 3.3 is that the transition rate matrix of our model
is rather parsimonious. To see why, recall that, at any given time, only one person revises her
selection with non zero probability. This feature of the model translates into a transition rate
matrix M that has many zeros in known locations.
We finally relate our results with the Gibbs random field models. These models have been
used to study social interactions by Allen (1982), Blume (1993, 1995), and Blume and Durlauf
(2003), among many others. We will use the connection between the two models to discuss the
identification of (Pa)a∈A from equilibrium behavior µ. To this end we will assume the rates of the
Poisson "alarm clocks" are identical for all people. In this case, by Proposition 2.1, the equilibrium
behavior µ relates linearly to the conditional choice probabilities (Pa)a∈A
µ(y) =
1
A
∑
a∈A
Pa(ya|y)µ(y−a) for each y ∈ Y
A
.
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The main difficulty for identification (if we only observe µ) is that the number of moments in the
data is usually smaller than the number of expressions we want to recover. This can be easily
seen if we eliminate the symmetry condition in Example 1. In this case, we would be interested in
recovering four conditional choice probabilities
P1(1|0),P1(1|1),P2(1|0), and P2(1|1).
(The conditional probabilities of choosing the default option can be obtained directly from the
latter.) In this illustration, the dataset would contain four equilibrium moments, namely, µ(o, o),
µ(1, o), µ(o, 1), and µ(1, 1). The issue is that (at most) only three of them can be linearly indepen-
dent. So, in this case, the choice probabilities we are interested in would be just partially identified.
It is also clear from the example that this issue is solved if we add symmetry across people. If we do
so, we would have only two elements to recover, and the model would be overidentified. Moreover,
the conditional choice probabilities would relate to the equilibrium conditions in a simple way
P(1|0) = µ(1, o)/[µ(o, o) + µ(1, o)] and P(1|1) = µ(1, 1)/[µ(1, 1) + µ(o, 1)].
That is, the conditional choice distributions of each person coincide with the corresponding condi-
tional distributions obtained from equilibrium behavior. This result can be extended to the case of
more options and/or more people by using the notion of compatibility of conditional distributions,
that we include next for completeness.
Definition: We say (Pa)a∈A is a set of compatible conditional distributions if there exists a joint
distribution P : Y
A
→ [0, 1], with
∑
y∈Y
A P (y) = 1, such that
Pa(ya|y) = P(y)/
∑
ya∈Y
P(y) for each y ∈ Y
A
.
The last identification result follows from connecting the equilibrium behavior in our model
with the Gibbs equilibrium. A similar connection is discussed in Blume and Durlauf (2003).
Proposition 3.4 (Dataset 3). If (Pa)a∈A is a set of compatible conditional distributions and
the rates of the Poisson "alarm clocks" are identical for all people, then the conditional choice
probabilities (Pa)a∈A are identified. Moreover,
Pa(ya|y) = µ(y)/µ−a(y−a) for each y ∈Y
A
.
Proof From Proposition 2.1, µ satisfies
µ(y) =
1
A
∑
a∈A
Pa(ya|y)µ−a(y−a) for each y ∈ Y
A
. (3)
We only need to show that if (Pa)a∈A is a set of compatible conditional distributions, then µ = P
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solves (3). If we let µ = P, then right hand side of (3) is
1
A
∑
a∈A
Pa(ya|y)
∑
v∈Y
P(v,y−a) =
1
A
∑
a∈A
P(y) =
A
A
P(y) = P(y).
In addition, the left hand side of (3) is
µ(y) = P(y).
Thus µ(y) = P(y) solves (3) for each y ∈ Y
A
. 
The technical conditions required for a set of conditional distributions to be compatible are
discussed in Kaiser and Cressie (2000). It is clear from their analysis that compatibility demands
strong symmetric restrictions. In particular, in the two people, two actions case, Arnold and Press
(1989) show that compatibility holds if and only if the next equality is satisfied
1−Q1(1|Nv1(y) = 0)
Q1(1|Nv1(y) = 0)
Q1(1|Nv1(y) = 1)
1−Q1(1|Nv1(y) = 1)
=
1−Q2(1|Nv2(y) = 0)
Q2(1|Nv2(y) = 0)
Q2(1|Nv2(y) = 1)
1−Q2(1|Nv2(y) = 1)
.
It follows that, though the identification strategy in Proposition 3.4 is interesting because it only
requires data on equilibrium behavior, its drawback is that the symmetry restrictions we need
to assume might not be quite appealing in practice. We next explain that (in our setting) these
restrictions could be relaxed if the network is large enough.
To elaborate on the last claim, let us assume there is an edge between each pair of people in
the network, so that all people are connected. The number of people in the network is A. For
each of them, there are Y available options (in addition to the default one). Thus, the number of
equilibrium points minus one (since all of them add up one) is
(Y + 1)A − 1.
It is clear that this number imposes an upper bound on the number of conditional choice proba-
bilities we can recover from the data. Recall that, for each alternative v ∈ Y ,
Pa(v|y) = Qa(v|Nva(y))
∏
v′∈Y ,v′≻av
[
1−Qa(v′|Nv
′
a (y))
]
.
Thus, in our model, the conditional choice probabilities of person a depend on the choices of
others only via the number of people that select each option. This invariant restriction reduces
the number of expressions we need to recover to
A× Y ×
(
A+ Y − 1
Y
)
.
It follows that the number of moments in the data is larger than the number of expressions we
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want to recover if and only if
(Y + 1)A − 1 ≥ A× Y ×
(
A+ Y − 1
Y
)
.
When Y = 1 and A = 2, as in Example 1, then this inequality is not fulfilled. (Indeed, we explained
earlier that the conditional choice probabilities are not identified from equilibrium behavior in this
case.) However, in the case of one alternative (in addition to the default option) the inequality
holds if there are at least five people in the network (that is, A ≥ 5). Moreover, the number of
people for which the inequality holds reduces to 4 whenever Y ≥ 2. That is, a moderately large
number of connections in the network seems to help the identification of the conditional choice
probabilities. Of course, this analysis is still not complete as some of the moments in the data
could still be linearly dependent.
4. Illustration: Choosing a Restaurant
This section simulates a sequence of choices for a simple version of our model that we apply to
restaurant decisions. The exercise has two aims. First, we illustrate how people’s mistakes relate
to the structure of the network. Second, we show how the main parts of the model can indeed be
estimated from the sequence of choices that we simulate.
4.1. Simulation
There are five people in the network. Their reference groups are as follows
N1 = {2} , N2 = {1} , N3 = {1, 2} , N4 = {5} , and N5 = {4} .
Note that each person has at least one friend, so A2 is satisfied. There are two possible restaurants
at which they can have dinner. Restaurant 1 offers Mediterranean food and Restaurant 2 is a
Steakhouse. Thus, Y = {1, 2}. The default option o involves eating at home. The preferences of
these people are as follows
2 ≻1 1, 1 ≻2 2, 2 ≻3 1, 1 ≻4 2, and 1 ≻5 2.
That is, Persons 2, 4, and 5 prefer Mediterranean food, and Persons 1 and 3 prefer the Steakhouse.
We will assume the attention mechanism is invariant across people and alternatives. In this case,
we can avoid some sub-indices and let Q(v|Nva(y)) be the probability that person a pays attention
to restaurant v ∈ Y if Nva(y) people of her reference group did so the last time they reviewed
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strategies. We initially let
Q(v|0) =
1
4
,Q(v|1) =
3
4
, and Q(v|2) =
7
8
.
The rates for their Poisson "alarm clocks" are 1.
The equilibrium behavior of this restaurant choice model is a joint distribution µ with support
on 243 choice configurations (35). We simulated a long sequences of choices and calculated the
equilibrium behavior. (See the Appendix for more details.) From the equilibrium behavior we can
easily obtain the marginal distributions across people.
µ1(o) = 0.30 µ2(o) = 0.30 µ3(o) = 0.19 µ4(o) = 0.30 µ5(o) = 0.30
µ1(1) = 0.30 µ2(1) = 0.40 µ3(1) = 0.29 µ4(1) = 0.50 µ5(1) = 0.50
µ1(2) = 0.40 µ2(2) = 0.30 µ3(2) = 0.52 µ4(2) = 0.20 µ5(2) = 0.20
Finally, from these marginals we get the following probabilities of making mistakes.
Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5
Probability of Mistakes 60% 60% 48% 50% 50%
Note that Persons 2 and 4 are identical in all respect except in the type of friend they have. In
particular, Person 4 shares with her friend the same preference relation over the two restaurants;
the opposite is true for Person 2. This difference leads Person 4 to make fewer mistakes. It becomes
clear from this illustration that homophyly is good news in our model! In addition, notice that
Person 3, having more friends, makes also fewer mistakes.
To illustrate a bit more how the network structure shapes people’s mistakes, let us add two more
connections in the model. In particular, let us assume that Person 3 is part of the consideration
sets of Persons 1 and 2. That is,
N1 = {2, 3} , N2 = {1, 3} , N3 = {1, 2} , N4 = {5} , and N5 = {4} .
Repeating the previous exercise, the new network generates the following marginal distributions.
µ1(o) = 0.12 µ2(o) = 0.12 µ3(o) = 0.12 µ4(o) = 0.30 µ5(o) = 0.30
µ1(1) = 0.21 µ2(1) = 0.42 µ3(1) = 0.22 µ4(1) = 0.50 µ5(1) = 0.50
µ1(2) = 0.67 µ2(2) = 0.46 µ3(2) = 0.66 µ4(2) = 0.20 µ5(2) = 0.20
From these marginals, the probabilities of mistakes are as follows.
Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5
Probability of Mistakes 33% 54% 34% 50% 50%
Notice that the probabilities of making mistakes decrease for Persons 1, 2, and 3. But the change
is larger for Persons 1 and 3 as they share the same preferences over the restaurants.
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4.2. Estimation
This section uses the sequence of choices we simulated in the previous section to show that the main
parts of the model can indeed be estimated. (In this case, identification follows by Proposition 3.3.)
To this end, we will use the second specification of the network structure. Also, to make the analysis
more tractable, we will impose three extra conditions: First, we will assume each person has at
most two friends. Second, we will assume the attention mechanism is invariant across people and
alternatives. Third, we will let the network be undirected. Under these assumptions the number
of possible sets of connections among people or networks is 112.3 In addition, recall that there are
5 people in the population and two restaurants. Thus, the number of profiles of strict preferences
≻ = (≻a)a∈A is 25 = 32. Finally, the attention mechanism has 3 parameters to estimate
Q = (Q(v|0),Q(v|1),Q(v|2))′ .
In line with A3, we will consider attention mechanisms that respect the monotonicity condition.
That is, Q(v|0) < Q(v|1) < Q(v|2).4 In addition, given A1, we let Q(v|Nva(y)) ∈ (0, 1) for
Nva(y) = 0, 1, 2. Let us indicate by θ = (Γ,≻,Q) an element in the space of possible parameters
we want to estimate. Each of them induces a transition rate matrix M(θ).
We normalize the intensity parameter λa to 1 for all a ∈ A. Thus, for each θ, we can construct
the transition rate matrix M(θ) using equations (1) and (2). In turn, this information allows to
calculate the so called transition matrix
P(θ,∆) = e∆M(θ).
We can use the latter to build the log-likelihood function
LT (θ) =
∑T−1
t=0
lnPι(yt),ι(yt+1)(θ,∆),
where ι(y) ∈
{
1, 2, ...,Y
A
}
is the position of y according the lexicographic order, and Pk,m (θ,∆)
is the (k,m)-th element of the matrix P(θ,∆). Finally, let us define the estimated parameters as
follows
θ̂T = argmaxθ LT (θ).
For a sequence of T = 15, 000 observations the Maximum Likelihood estimates are as follows
Network N̂1 = {2} , N̂2 = {1} , N̂3 = {1, 2} , N̂4 = {5} , and N̂5 = {4}
Preferences 2≻̂11, 1≻̂22, 2≻̂31, 1≻̂42, and 1≻̂52
Attention Mechanism Q̂ (v|0) = 0.26, Q̂ (v|1) = 0.75, and Q̂ (v|2) = 0.87
.
In summary, the estimates correctly recover the set of connections and the strict preference order
of each person in the network and closely approximates the attention mechanism.
3Without any restriction there are 225 = 33, 554, 432 possible network configurations.
4Technically speaking, for estimation purposes, we can only impose weak inequalities.
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5. Final Remarks
This paper offers a new model of interdependent choices that combines the dynamic model of social
interactions of Blume (1993, 1995) with the (single-agent) model of random consideration sets of
Manzini and Mariotti (2014). From a theoretical perspective, we state equilibrium existence and
characterize equilibrium behavior. We also illustrate how the network structure shapes people’s
mistakes. From an applied perspective, in our model, the choices of peers act as exclusion restric-
tions in the stochastic variation of the considerations sets. This feature allows us to recover (from
data) the main parts of the model without relying on variation of the set of alternative options
or menus. Interestingly, we show that in addition of nonparametrically recovering the ranking of
preferences of each person and the attention mechanism, we also identify the set of connections or
nodes between the people in the network.
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A. Simulation for Section 4
This appendix describes how we generated the observations for the restaurant model
Let λ =
∑
a∈A λa. We generate the data according to an iterative procedure for a fixed time
period T . The k-th iteration of the procedure is as follows:
(i) Given yk−1 set yk = yk−1;
(ii) Generate a draw from the exponential distribution with mean 1/λ and call it xk;
(iii) Randomly sample an agent from the set A, such that the probability that a is picked is λa/λ;
(iv) Given the agent selected in the previous step and the current choice configuration yk construct
a consideration set using Qa;
(v) If the consideration set is empty, then set ya,k = 0. Otherwise pick the best alternative
according to the preference order of agent a from the consideration set and assign it to ya,k.
Given the initial configuration of choices y0 we applied the above algorithm till we reached∑
k xk > T (On average the length of the sequence is λT ). Define zk =
∑
l≤k xl. The continuous
time data is {(yk, zk)}. The discrete time data is obtained from the continuous time data by
splitting the interval [0, T ] into T = [T /∆] intervals and recording the configuration of the network
at every time period t = i∆, i = 0, 1, ..., [T /∆].
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